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Development of web services is a step toward universal interoperability between 
applications by using web standards. The complete prospective of web services as an 
integration platform can only be accomplished by combining the complex interactions 
among the applications and business processes using a standard process integrated model. 
These interactions typically suppose to be the sequences of peer to peer synchronous or 
asynchronous message exchanges. A business process requires a proper description of the 
message exchange protocol for interactions. In these protocols the message exchange 
behavior among parties should be visible without disclosing their internal 
implementation. 
“Business Process Execution Language for Web Services usually called BPEL is a 
language for the formal specification of business processes and business interaction 
protocols” [2]. It expands the web services so that they can interact with each other and 
capable for supporting exchange of data, business documents, agreements, payments, 
contracts, acknowledgements, and business transactions among themselves. BPEL is an 
XML-based flow language. It defines the interaction of business processes. Complex 
processes can be created in BPEL by developing and integrating different activities e.g. 
different Web services invocations, manipulate data, throw faults, or end a process and 
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these activities are nested within structured activities in order to run them parallel, or 
sequential or depending on required conditions. 
“The role of BPEL4WS is to define a new Web service by composing a set of 
existing services to enable business processes to interoperate within and between 
companies that use different underlying technologies (universal interoperability)”[2]. 
Web services broadcast themselves so that other web services can discover them 
and also invoke them creating a communication amongst each other. BPEL provides an 
environment to describe business processes that include multiple Web services and 
standardize message exchange internally and among partners. Linking those web services 
together into a one large business process gave the user a number of disputing dilemmas. 
One of these problems is Non-repudiation which means denial of having 
participated in a message exchange. Non-repudiation is one of the important security 
issues. “Non-repudiation is a security service which creates, collects, validates and 
maintain cryptographic evidence of an electronic transaction to support the settlement of 
a possible disputes “[1]. A numbers of protocols have been developed to solve Non-
repudiation. In general, the messages are encrypted with a secret key and send it to the 
receiver. 
Fairness of a protocol depends on who is controlling the execution of the protocol. 
It may be inclined either toward the sender or receiver, or may be fair to both. For 
example receiver repudiation can be avoided by designing a protocol such that the sender 
sends the encrypted message and does not release the encryption key until he gets a 
receipt acknowledgment from the receiver. Such a protocol is in the favor of the sender 
because he may not send key after receiving acknowledgement and claims that he did. On 
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the other hand a Trusted Third Party (TTP) is involved which releases the key to the 
receiver and message no longer under control of sender after sending the encrypted 
message to the receiver which makes protocol fair for the receiver. To eliminate the 
presence of TTP at the time of dispute, the protocol needs to generate enough digital 
evidences for both the sender and the receiver. 
Petri Net is a graphical and mathematical tool [10] used for modeling and 
analyzing system with concurrency. Petri Nets have been successfully used for modeling 
of communication protocols. Petri net consists of Places, Transitions and Arcs. 
Transitions are active components and on firing change the state of the system. The 
current state of the system is represented by number of tokens at a Place. Both Places and 
Transitions are connected by Arcs. Arcs from Places to Transitions are inputs and Arcs 
from transitions to Places are called outputs.  
Motivation: 
WS-security is used to make secure communication among BPEL processes but it 
does not provide fairness and accountability. To fulfill such requirements there is a need 
to use a fair non-repudiation protocol. In this thesis, we propose a number of Non-
repudiation protocols for different scenarios. The proposed protocols are specified in 
BPEL because they provide security, accountability, fairness, timeliness and 
confidentiality. Furthermore we use Petri Net in order to analyze the proposed non-
repudiation protocols that are specified in BPEL are correct.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:  chapter 2 introduces the BPEL and 
basic notations used in web services and business processes. It also gives a brief 
introduction to Non-repudiation protocols. We describe the objective of this thesis in 
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chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we propose the non-repudiation protocols, specify them in BPEL 






















2.1 Literature review on BPEL4WS: 
The BPEL is an XML-based standard that is used to combine Web services in 
order to develop business processes. “It provides an XML-based grammar for describing 
the control logic required to coordinate web services participating in a process flow and is 
layered on the top of WSDL, with BPEL defining how the WSDL operation should be 
sequenced” [2]. BPEL consist of two types of processes: executable and abstract. 
Abstract process: 
An abstract process is a business protocol, specifying the message exchange 
behavior between different parties without revealing internal activities. In BPEL process 
all partners and their interactions are represented in terms of abstract WSDL interface 
(portType and operations) with no reference to the actual services invoked by the process 
instance.  
Executable process: 
It specifies the execution order between a number of activities constituting the 
process, the partners involved in the process, the messages exchanged between these 
partners, and the fault and exception handling specifying the behavior in cases of errors 
and exceptions. 
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2.1.1 Relation with WSDL: 
The interaction between the service and its partners are represented in the WSDL 
file. The portTypes, which reside in the WSDL file, are used as reference to define a 
BPEL process. Since the possible deployment of the process is not used to define BPEL 
process, it allows the reuse of business process definitions for several deployments.  
2.1.2 Relation with SOAP: 
There are operations in WSDL file that bound to a number of protocols, one of 
which is SOAP. BPEL does not specify which binding to use. There are ports in WSDL 
file and each port must be associated with a binding. 
2.1.3 Security in BPEL: 
“It is strongly recommended that business process implementations use WS-
Security to ensure messages have not been modified or forged while in transit or while 
residing at destinations” [2]. WS-security provides security by secure SOAP message 
exchange. 
2.1.4 BPWS4J: A runtime engine for BPEL 
The BPWS4J is a runtime engine [27] that takes BPEL document which includes 
the process to be executed, the WSDL document of the services that process may invoke 
during execution, and the WSDL document that contain the interface information that the 
process will present to the client process. This runtime engine automatically generates the 
bindings that are required to interact and the process is available as a Web service with a 
SOAP interface. Runtime engine supports the invocation of Web services with SOAP 
interface, or EJBs, or normal Java classes. 
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  BPWS4J is used for creating and executing BPEL4WS processes. Platform 
required for BPWS4J are Linux, Windows® 2000 or other platforms for which Eclipse 
2.1 is available. Eclipse editor is used to create and edit BPEL files. JDK 1.3 is 
mandatory for Eclipse editor. 
User    Eclipse Editor (JDK mandatory)  
                                                                                             If no error 
      
                                              If errors 
Process 





2.2 Literature review on non-repudiation protocol: 
There are two approaches for fair non-repudiation.  In general these protocols 
encrypt the message with a secret key and send it to the receiver and then two the parties 
exchange a delivery receipt and the message key to get the original message. An alternate 
approach is to involve a trusted third party that acts as a notary. 
We consider different cases in message passing protocols [1, 3, 4, 15]. Assume 
that A wishes to send a message M to B and get the corresponding receipt. TTP is a 
trusted third party.  
Basic Notations 
eK(X) and dK(X): encryption and decryption of message X with key K. 
sK(X): digital signature of message X with the private key K. 
PA, SA: the public and private key of A. 
s: signature 
A → B: X : A send message X to B. 
A ↔ B: X : A fetches message X from B. 
NRO = sSA (fNRO, B, L, C): Non-repudiation of Origin of M. 
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NRR = sSB (fNRR, A, L, C):  Non-repudiation of Receipt of M. 
sub_K = sSA (fSUB, B, L, K): proof of submission of K. 
con_K = sST (fCON, A, B, L, K): confirmation of K issued by TTP. 
 fNRO: flag information indicating NRO (Non-repudiation of Origin) 
fNRR: flag information indicating NRR (Non-repudiation of Receipt) 
 fSUB: flag information indicating submission of key. 
 fCON: flag information indicating confirmation of key issued by TTP. 
fACK: flag information indicating acknowledgement. 
Case 1: Sender and receiver are fair to each other and communicating channel is 
completely reliable. In this case, the protocol is very simple. 
1. A → B : fNRO, B, M, sSA (fNRO, B, M) 
Sender A is sending a message M signed with its private key to B. Here sSA (fNRO, 
B, M) is a digital signature on message (fNRO, B, M) with the private key of A. 
2. B → A : fNRR, A, sSB (fNRR, A, M) 
Where, sSB (fNRR, A, M) is a digital signature on message (fNRR, A, M) with the 
private key of B. The signatures of sender and receiver serve as evidence. Note that in the 
scheme the message is not encrypted. 
Case 2: Sender and receiver don’t necessarily play a fair role, but the 
communicating channel is completely fair.  The above protocol is advantageous to B in a 
situation where A sends a message and B can refuse to send an acknowledgement. This 
problem can be solved by involving a TTP. 
 1. A→ TTP : fNRO, TTP, B, M, sSA (fNRO, TTP, B, M) 
2. TTP → B : fNRS, A, B, M, sST (fNRS, A, B, M) 
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Where sST (fNRS, A, B, M) is a digital signature of TTP using its private key. 
3. TTP →A : fNRD, A, B, sST (fNRD, A, B, M) 
Signatures of the TTP serve as proof of submission. Still this protocol is 
advantageous to B in a situation where B could deny having received the TTP’s message. 
Case 3: Sender and receiver are fair to each other but the communicating 
channel is not completely reliable. Each message can be sent over and over again until 
acknowledgment has been received. 
1. A → B : fNRO, B, M, sSA (fNRO, B, M) 
2. B → A : fNRR, A, sSB (fNRR, A, M) 
B confirms receipt of A’s message. 
3. A → B : fACK, B, sSA (fACK, B, M) 
As the communication channel is not reliable, A informs B that it has received 
B’s receipt of A’s message. We assume that B repeatedly does step 2 until A’s 
acknowledgment.  In this protocol B has an advantage in a situation where B need not 
provide a proof of receipt.  
Case 4: Both parties do not necessarily play fair and the communication channel 
is not reliable. To solve this problem, the encrypted message is sent under the key K that 
is sent later. 
1. A → B : fPOE, B, eK (M), sSA (fPOE, B, eK(M)) 
2. B → A : fACP, A, sSB (fACP, A, eK( M )) 
3. A → B : fNRO, B, K, sSA (fNRO, B, K) 
4. B → A : fNRR, A, sSB (fNRR, A, K) 
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Unfortunately, the problem is still there and B can refuse to send the last message, 
leaving A without proof of receipt. 
2.3 J. Zhou and D. Gollmann’s Protocol: 
This protocol considers that the communication channel is not reliable and the 
two parties do not necessarily play fair. “A non-repudiation protocol is fair if it provides 
the originator and the recipient with valid irrefutable evidence after completion of the 
protocol, without giving any party an advantage over the other at any stage of 
protocol”[3]. 
2.3.1 ZG’s fair protocol 
In this protocol [3], the originator divides a message into two parts, a commitment 
C and a key K. C is a cipher text of message M, e.g. M encrypted with a key K. L is a 
unique label for the protocol run. This protocol assume that A, B and TTP are each 
equipped with their own private signature key and the related public verification keys and 
even in case of network failure, both parties will be able to retrieve the key from TTP. 
The main idea of this protocol is to send C first and then key K, which unlocks the 
message, is released: 
1. A → B : fNRO, B, L, C, NRO  
2. B → A : fNRR, A, L, NRR  
3. A → TTP : fSUB, B, L, K, sub_K  
4. B ↔ TTP : fCON, A, B, L, K, con_K  




Figure 2.1: A Fair Non-repudiation Protocol 
In step 1, A sends the encrypted message to B. In step 2, B confirms receipt, but 
cannot access the original message. In step 3, A submits the key to the TTP; sub_K is the 
proof of submission of K. The TTP stores the tuple (A, B, L, K, con_K) in some read 
only directory available to public; con_K is the confirmation of key issued by the TTP. In 
step 4, B gets the key and in step5 A confirms that B can indeed get the key.  
The protocol is called “fair” but as pointed out in [4], the protocol has some 
weaknesses. First, the successful execution of the protocol depends on whether the sender 
submits the key to TTP. So it is advantageous to senders and the protocol is not fair to the 
message recipients. Secondly, the encrypted key K is visible to TTP, thus, anyone who 
can access the key at TTP is able to access the original contents of message M. 
2.4 Non-repudiation Message Protocol for Collaborative E-business: 
In this protocol [15], the message is encrypted with secret key, which is generated 
at runtime. The sender sends a message encrypted with the secret key. That key is 
‘double-encrypted’ which means a twice-encrypted secret key that is  first encrypted with 
the receiver’s public key and then with the public key of TTP. 
Encrypted message = em = eK(M) 
Double-encrypted Key = dek = ePTTP(ePR(K)) 
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Where M is the original message, K is secret key, PR is private key of recipient 
and PTTP is private key of TTP. The receiver can access original message only using 
secret key. 
Step1: The sender generates the secret key randomly to encrypt the message. It 
then double-encrypt the secret key. Signature is generated on concatenation of the 
message digest of the encrypted message and the message digest of the double encrypted 
secret key. All this information is sent to the recipient. 
              S             R : t id | S | em | dek | dual_signature 
Where [15],   tid = transaction id 
  dual_signature = t id | md1 | md2 | sSS(t id | md1 | md2) 
md1= MD(em): message digest of the message 
md2= MD(dek): message digest of the double encrypted key 
Step 2: The recipient forwards double-encrypted key to the TTP along with its 
signature that he received a correct encrypted message as an acknowledgement. The 
recipient is required to send his signature, otherwise TTP will not reply to it. 
               R            TTP : t id | S | R | md1 | dek | sSR(t id | md1) 
Step 3: TTP decrypts the double-encrypted key and release the encrypted key to 
the recipient and wait for the acknowledgement from R for sometime. 
             TTP             R : t id | ek_from_TTP 
   Where    ek_from_TTP = dSTTP( dek ) : decryption of dek using private 
key of TTP. 
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Step 4: After getting the secret key and the message by decrypting it with its own 
private key, the receiver creates a signature on the digested secret key and sends it to TTP 
which is the conformation of receiving the secret key.  
              R          TTP : t id | sSR(MD(ek_from_TTP)) 
Step 5: In the final step of the protocol, TTP forwards two signatures that he has 
received in step 2 and 4 from recipient to the original sender. 
                           TTP           S : t id | sSR(t id | md1) | sSR(MD(ek_from_TTP)) 















BPEL4WS is a model and a grammar for describing the behavior of a business 
process on interactions between the process and its partners and it involves invocation of 
different web services to achieve business goals.  It interacts with partners and web 
services by message passing. There are two things to be considered.  
• Usually messages at the business level may contain confidential types of 
documents so it is required that no one else can get the original messages except 
the partner to which it is sent.  
• There is a problem of repudiation among parties. 
To avoid these circumstances we propose a protocol that protects the 
confidentiality of message contents such that no unauthorized intermediary is able to see 
the original message and achieve non-repudiation by involving a trusted third authority 
(TTP) but do not need the third party at the time of dispute and more over the third party 
cannot access the secret key and hence the original message. This is done by encrypting 
the message with a secret key and then double encrypts that key. It means a twice-
encrypted secret key that is encrypted with the recipient’s public key first and then with 
the public key of Trusted third party (TTP) involved in the protocol.  
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We propose a novel Non-repudiation protocol for a chain linked business 
transactions that may involve more intermediate parties in many different topologies. In 
our protocol, intermediate parties may or may not be able to access and modify the 
original message depending upon the authorization needed. We extend this protocol to 
facilitate the sender to send different messages to the multiple entities. When there are 
multiple entities involved, there is a high probability of communication bottleneck 
created at the TTP. The proposed protocol aims to reduce this bottleneck.   In the 
proposed protocol, the originator can send the messages to multiple recipients using a 
single key. The third party therefore needs to decrypt only a single key and not multiple 
keys from each entity involved in the business communication.  We also propose a 
protocol with an intermediate entity which acts as a hub, thus reducing the load on the 
originator. In our chain- linked protocols, the recipient can get the key only after 
identifying himself, which means the key cannot be revealed to a wrong unidentified 
party. We analyze that protocol to make it optimal, improve, efficient, secure and 
accountable. We specify these non-repudiation protocols in BPEL.  
This thesis also proposes a Petri Net merging method to model the integration of 
web services and business processes. We use Petri net to get the reliability of chain-
linked business transaction. We use color Petri net to explain the flow of chain-linked 









Methodology and Approach 
4.1 Assumptions: 
1. Web services within the organization can trust each other. A non-repudiation 
protocol is therefore required only when communication is in between external 
services. 
2.  Third party is not available at the time of dispute. 
3. Communication channels are reliable.  
4. Key generating algorithms are out of scope.  
BPEL is a layer on top of WSDL, that is, it uses WSDL to specify actions that 
should take place in a business process, and to describe the web services provided by a 
business process. There are ports in WSDL that must be associated with bindings, one of 
which is SOAP.  
 
SOAP (header, encryption, key, signature, etc) 
WSDL (definition, messageType, portType, etc) 
BPEL4WS (process, activities)  
 
 
4.2 Building reliable asynchronous process: 
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By default, web services perform synchronous operations. In our case we focus on 
security, fairness and accountability. Each process may be asynchronous, that is, the 
originator may start a business transaction with a receiver at any time. However, the non-
repudiation protocol for each individual business transaction is synchronous. To enable 
asynchronous communication using web services, every party involved in the protocol 
should be implemented as a web services. This make a peers-to-peer process where all 
parties can initiate conversation when necessary.  
4.2.1 Flow of a protocol 
Brief description:  
We consider a transaction between two parties, one is a Buyer and other is a 
supplier. We involve a Trusted Third Party to establish Non-repudiation between parties. 
We divide the Buyer BPEL process into two components because the requested business 
processes may take time for processing request. There are four public web services 
(considering BPEL process as a web service) and some internal web service.  An internal 
web service, which is an inventory manager, sends an order to replenish inventory to the 
buyer request process. The buyer request process now needs to interact with the external 
web service. These are the steps executed between a requester and a supplier. 
1. Requester sends a purchase message, which is encrypted with double-encrypted 
key (Key is first encrypted with the public key of the recipient and then with the 
public key of TTP) to the seller along with the double-encrypted key and dual 
signature (signature on the message digest of the double encrypted key and 
message digest of the encrypted message – see chapter 2). 
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2. Supplier receives the encrypted message and sends an acknowledgement receipt 
back to the requester after checking the integrity of main content eK(M) and 
double-encrypted key by comparing with the dual signature. Both eK(M) and the 
double-encrypted key are checked by the supplier generating the message digests 
and comparing with the message digests in the signature. So supplier confirms 
that it receives the correct encrypted message contents before proceeding. 
3. Supplier forwards the double-encrypted key to the TTP, along with its signature1 
on the message digest of encrypted message to acknowledge the correct receipt of 
the encrypted message. Supplier is required to send this signature1 to the TTP in 
order to access the key. TTP stores the signature1 temporarily for signature 
distribution at the end of the protocol. 
4. TTP decrypt the double-encrypted key using its private key and releases the 
encrypted key to the Supplier. The TTP then waits for acknowledgement from the 
supplier. In case the TTP does not receive this acknowledgement within a certain 
timeout, TTP detects the supplier’s misbehavior.  
5. The supplier decrypts the encrypted key received form the TTP using its private 
key. It then sends signature2 on the message digest of the decrypted secret key to 
the TTP, as confirmation of receiving the key. The supplier creates the signature2 
on the digested secret key so that TTP cannot access any key information from the 
signature.  
6. TTP sends two signatures in step 2 and step 4 to the original sender. These two 
signatures are the supplier’s acknowledgement of receiving correct purchase 
message and secret key.   
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Figure 4.1: The e-business dialogue 
7. After processing the buyer’s request, supplier sends the encrypted purchase 
acceptance message, along with double encrypted key and dual signature to 
second component of buyer as in step 1. 
8. Buyer Acceptance process sends an acknowledgement receipt back to supplier. 
9. This is same as step 3, but instead of supplier, this message is send by Buyer 
Receiver component to TTP.  
10. TTP decrypt the double-encrypted key and release the encrypted key to the Buyer 
Receiver component process.  
11. The Buyer Receiver component sends signature to the TTP, the confirmation of 
receiving the key same as in step 5. 
12. The protocol ends with TTP forwarding both signatures to seller.  
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There are 12 messages. We can reduce it to 10 by removing step 2 and 8 and use 
step 6 and 12 as acknowledgments.   
4.3 Building the Non-repudiation BPEL4WS Processes: 
Conceptually, we need only three processes, one for buyer, one for supplier and one 
for TTP. The supplier may take time to process order so we need to split the buyer process as 
two separate BPEL4WS processes. We develop a business process to show a quick overview 
of the activities and syntax of BPEL. 
4.3.1 Building the public Web service definitions: 
Start from the WSDL definitions for processes, starting with Buyer.wsdl shown in figure 
4.2. This web service allows replenishing inventory by placing order according to their 
need. 
“BPEL4WS enabled WSDL definitions require some additional information and since 
this WSDL file will be used in the BPEL4WS process, it requires a service link definition 
to be added to the file. Service links enable partners in the BPEL4WS process to be 
linked to actual "actions" defined in the BPEL process.”[5]. 
Following is the Buyer.wsdl file. Logic is the same as in [5] 
 
<definitions targetNamespace="http://www.buyer.com/services/Buyer" 
             xmlns:BUYER="http://www.buyer.com/services/Buyer" 
        xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
             xmlns:slt="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/service-link/" 
             xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
             xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"> 
 
   <message name="ReplenishInventroyRequest"> 
      <part name="PORequest" type="xsd:string"/> 
   </message> 
   <message name="ReceiptAcknowledgement"> 
      <part name="receiptAck" type="xsd:string"/> 
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   </message> 
<message name="SignaturefromTTP"> 
      <part name="SupSignatureOnPO" type="xsd:string"/> 
   </message> 
 
   <portType name="ReplenishInventoryRequestPort"> 
      <operation name="replenishRequest"> 
         <input message="BUYER:ReplenishInventoryRequest"/> 
         <output message="BUYER:ReceiptAcknowledgement"/> 
      </operation> 
   </portType> 
<portType name="SignaturefromTTPPort"> 
      <operation name="SignatureReceive"> 
         <input message="BUYER:SignaturefromTTP"/> 
      </operation> 
   </portType> 
 
   <slt:serviceLinkType name="ReplenishInventoryRequestSLT"> 
     <slt:role name="inventoryService"> 
       <slt:portType name="BUYER:ReplenishInventoryRequestPort"/> 
     </slt:role> 
   </slt:serviceLinkType> 
 
<slt:serviceLinkType name="SignatureTransmitReqSLT"> 
     <slt:role name="GetSignatureFromTTP"> 
       <slt:portType name="BUYER:SignaturefromTTPPort"/> 
     </slt:role> 
   </slt:serviceLinkType> 
   <!—BPWS4J Engine will automatically generate the bindings--> 
<service name="BUYERPORequesterServiceBP"> 
   </service> 
</definitions> 
Figure 4.2: Buyer.wsdl 
 
There are three messages, a request for purchase order, acknowledgment receipt of the 
request, and signature from TTP.  
Service links are used to define the capabilities of partners in the BPEL process. A 
partner is linked to a portType and also a set of operations in the WSDL file using those 
service links. In this example, Web service is an associated component of a BPEL 
process, the BPWS4J engine automatically generates the necessary bindings which helps 
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the BPEL process to absorb the Web service, listening to the defined ports for any 
activity [5]. Therefore, the service and bindings sections of the WSDL definition are 
empty. 
4.3.2 Request Component of Buyer: 
This process takes the request from an inventory manager and sends request with 
double-encrypted key to the supplier. In the final step it receives signatures from TTP. There 
are three partners of the buyer request process - inventory manager, Supplier and TTP. We 
first define partners and containers to store data. 
The BPEL process at the buyer is BUYERrequest.bpel. It is layered on top of the 
BUYER.wsdl file that we created earlier. 
BUYERrequest.bpel is as follow. Logic is the same as in [5] 
<process name="BUYERrequestProcess" 
          targetNamespace="http://www.buyer.com/services/BUYERrequestProcess" 
          xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/business-process/" 
          xmlns:buy="http://www.buyer.com/services/Buyer" 
          xmlns:supply="http://www.supplier.com/wsdl/POService"> 
          xmlns:TTP="http://www.ttp.com/services/TTPservice"> 
 
<!-- This process has three partners, the internal inventory service that triggers the --> 
<!-- process and the Supplier, to whom the PORequest is sent and TTP             --> 
 
  <partners> 
    <partner name="inventoryService" 
                                   serviceLinkType="buy:ReplenishInventoryRequestSLT"/> 
    <partner name="supplier" serviceLinkType="supply:PORequestSLT"/> 
    <partner name="TTP" serviceLinkType="TTP:TTPrequestSLT"/> 
  </partners> 
 
<containers> 
  <container name="replenishRequestCTR" 
                                    messageType="buy:ReplenishInventroyRequest"/> 
    <container name="replenishResponseCTR" 
                                    messageType="buy:ReceiptAcknowledgement"/> 
    <container name="outputPORequestAckContainer" 
 22
                                    messageType="supply:ReceiptAckPORequestType"/> 
    <container name="SupplierSignaturefromTTP"  
                                    messageType="buy:SignaturefromTTP"/> 




<!-- Receive the inventory manager PO Request and store it in replenishRequest 
container--> 
 <receive name="ReplenishRecieve" 
             partner="inventoryService"    portType="buy:ReplenishInventoryRequestPort" 
             operation="replenishRequest" 
             container="replenishRequestCTR" createInstance="yes"> 
   </receive>    
 
<!-- Initialize container --> 
<assign> 
      <copy> 
        <from expression="'initializing'"/> 
        <to container="replenishResponseCTR" part="receiptAck"/> 
      </copy> 
</assign> 
  
<!-- Invoke placePORequest service at supplier Inc --> 
<invoke name="PlacePOwithSeller" 
            partner="supplier" portType="supply:placePORequestPort" 
operation="placePORequest" 
            inputContainer="replenishRequestCTR"  
            outputContainer="outputPORequestAckContainer"/> 
 
<!-- Copy acknowledgement receipt from supplier to be sent to Inventory Manager --> 
<assign> 
      <copy> 
         <from container="outputPORequestAckContainer" part="receipt"/> 
         <to container="replenishResponseCTR" part="receiptAck"/> 
      </copy> 
</assign> 
 
<!-- Reply to inventory manager with the acknowledgement receipt of the PO Order 
sent by supplier --> 
<reply name="ReplenishResponse" 
           partner="inventoryService" 
           portType="buy:ReplenishInventoryRequestPort"  
           operation="replenishRequest" 
           container="replenishResponseCTR"> 
</reply> 
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<--    Process receive Signature from TTP      --> 
<receive name="SignatureRecieve" 
             partner="TTP" portType="buy:SignaturefromTTPPort "  
             operation="SignatureReceive" 
             container="SupplierSignaturefromTTP" createInstance="no"> 




Figure 4.3: BUYERrequest.bpel 
 
In this process, after defining the partners and containers of the process, we 
specify the BPEL activities of the process start with the sequence activity. 
Begin sequence 
• Receive a request from the Inventory Manager and deposit it in the request 
container.  
• Assign the data from the request container to the container to be sent to supplier.  
• Invoke a "place purchase order" request with supplier based on data stored in the 
pervious step.  
• Assign the acknowledgement received from supplier to container being sent to 
Inventory Manager.  
• Reply to the Inventory Manager with the response from supplier. 
• Receive the signatures from trusted third party show that supplier has accessed the 
original message.  
End sequence 
Note: Receive, Invoke, Reply, and Assign etc. are the BPEL activities. See appendix for 
more detail. 
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4.3.3 Supplier Process: 
The sequence of activities of BPEL process at supplier is as follow: 
Begin sequence  
• Receive the Request from Buyer Request process.  
• Assign a receipt message in the container that is used in the reply activity.  
• Reply to Buyer Request process.  
• Assign encrypted message and double encrypted key in the container that used in 
the invoke activity.  
• Invoke the TTP process and send the Double-encrypted key and signature1. 
• After receiving the key from the TTP it again invoke the TTP process to send the 
signature2. 
• After processing the order send the order status to the Buyer Acceptance process 
by invoke. 
• Finally, it receives the signatures of buyer receive process from TTP. 
End sequence 
4.3.4 Acceptance Component of Buyer: 
The second BPEL process at BUYER has following sequence. 
Begin sequence  
• Receive the Acceptance from Supplier.   
• Reply to the supplier with the receipt acknowledgement. 
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• Invoke the TTP to decrypt the double encryption key and send the signature1 (on 
the message digest of original message and dek), and to get the encrypted key. 
• Invoke the TTP to send the signature2 (on the digested key) after accessing 
original message.  
End sequence 
4.3.5 TTP Process: 
The Fourth BPEL process places at the TTP. 
Begin sequence 
• Receive the Request and signature1 from the supplier process to decrypt the 
key. 
• Reply to the request from the supplier process. 
• Receive the signature2 from the supplier process. 
• Invoke the Buyer Request process to send the signatures of the supplier 
process.  
• Receive the request and signature1 from Buyer Acceptance process to decrypt 
the key. 
• Reply to the request from the Buyer Acceptance process. 
• Receive the signature2 from the Buyer Acceptance process. 




4.4 Security Information:  
Because messages can be modified, it is recommended that business process 
implementation use WS-Security (web service security). It provides security by keeping 
security information in the SOAP part of the message. WS-security does not provide 
fairness and accountability. To fulfill such requirements there is a need to use the fair 
non-repudiation protocol.  
4.5 Petri Net Model of BPEL: 
BPEL processes consist of two types, abstract process and executable process. 
Both processes contain elements that can be model in Petri nets. 
4.5.1 Petri Net Model of Abstract BPEL Process: 
In our model the mapping of WSDL’s parts [12] is as below 
 Place →  PortType (Operations – input, output messages) 
Transition → ServiceLinkType (Name, my role, partner role) 
Token → Message (Data) 
Arc → Binding  
 
Note: The Service link type definition can be placed within the WSDL document 





4.5.2 Petri Net Model of Executable BPEL Process: 
We can model BPEL process using Petri net. The mapping for BPEL process is 
defined as:  
Place →  Containers  
Transition → Invoke, Receive, Reply, Assign, Switch  




A sequence activity is represented hierarchically and can be refined into a number 
of lower level activities such as invoke, receive etc.  
Models of each process are merged to obtain a system-wide view a complete web 
business transaction. Although the individual models may display the desired properties 
of livness, safeness and complete termination, the merged net may not display such 
properties. 
4.5.3 Petri Net Model of Paradigm: 
The Petri net modeling captures websites, which use web services, such as the 
inventory manager’s website in our case. The web service on that site calls the Buyer 
Request process which may invoke different processes to fulfill the request and so on. 
The whole procedure of business processes and transactions involving web services is 
represented as a big web. 
 To draw the Petri net of B2B processes, global information of the processes are 
required. Each process is only aware of itself and other web services (or BPEL processes) 
it calls. The entire business transaction can be therefore modeled by merging the models 
of individual transactions. 
When a process or web service needs to be invoked, its respective WSDL file is traced. A 
WSDL file has all the information required to communicate.  The complete Petri net 
represents all the possible execution paths of the whole system, in our case inventory 
manager’s web method (web services) is followed by the WSDL and then the web 
service and then WSDL of process and so on.  
Figure 4.6 shows the Petri net model of executable BPEL processes. It starts with 
inventory manager. This model also shows a switch statements in the supplier process 
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when number of available products is less then the requested.  It invokes manufacturer in 
order to fulfill the demand. Places represent containers in process, Transitions represents 
invoke and incoming Arcs to the transitions represent out going data and outgoing Arcs 
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Figure 4.4: Petri net modeling of BPEL process 
4.6 A Novel Non-repudiation Protocol for a Chain of Business Transactions: 
The protocol presented in Section 4.2 established non-repudiation between two 
individual parties. However, business transactions are rarely so simple, and may involve 
more parties in many different topologies. For example, in a multicast scenario, a request 
(such as a contract bid) may be multicast to a number of different vendors. Each vendor 
may contact their suppliers for more information. Some, if not all of the vendors will 
come back with a quote to the originator of the request. There is a need for non-
repudiation in such a multicast environment. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
consider all possible scenarios. We consider a chain-linked business transaction. Assume 
a supplier (X) wants to publish details about a new product (say a bar of soap). He 
publishes the information to a public Market Place called Transora. Transora gets the 
information from a lot of suppliers. Retailer (X) sells soap and wants to know when new 
soap products are available.  Retailer (X) has relationship with UCCnet. UCCnet sends 
information to a lot of retailers. The flow will be:  
                                To other marketplaces  
Supplier(X)                   Transora                 UCCnet                              Retailer(X)  
From other Suppliers                                                To other retailers  
We simplify above initially to just:  
 
 
Transora UCCnet Retailer(X) Supplier(X) 
Issues:  
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How can Retailer(X) be guaranteed that the information he received is indeed 
from Supplier(X)?  Or how can Supplier(X) be guaranteed that Retailer(X) did actually 
get the new product detail? We propose a novel non-repudiation protocol for chain linked 
business transactions. 
Approach: 
Non-repudiation in a chain linked system is as follow. 
 
          A               B                C                D                                          N 
There are following cases 
Case 1:        A           N 
Intermediate businesses (B, C, D …) cannot access message or key. 
Case 2:        A           N 
Intermediate businesses (B, C, D …) can access message, modify it or add their own 
information.  
4.6.1 Design and Approach; Case 1: 
To avoid modification in the message by the intermediate nodes, there must be a 
Non-repudiation protocol down the whole business linked chain. The proposed protocol 
works as follow. We have borrowed notation from [15]              
Where K: a symmetric key generated by A 
t id: transaction id 
em = eK(M) 
ek_from_A = ePN(K)  dek = ePTTP(ek_from_A) 
md1 = MD(em)  md2 = MD(dek)  md3 = MD(id_N) 
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id_N = ePN(id-message) id-message generated by originator 
id_TTP = ePTTP(id-message) 
treble signature = t id | md1 | md2 | md3 | sSA(t id | md1 | md2 | md3) 
 
Figure 4.5: A Non-repudiation Protocol for Chained Linked Business Transaction. 
Step 1:  The A sends the encrypted id-message, encrypted message, double encrypted key 
and treble signature to the B, who sends it to the C and so on until it reaches the N. 
Message from A             B :  t id | A | B | N | id_N | em | dek | treble signature 
Message from B             C :  t id | B | C | N | id_N | em | dek | treble signature 
Note: This will not stop intermediate nodes from corrupting the message. 
Step 2:   The A encrypts the id-message with public key of TTP and sends it to the TTP.    
A             TTP : tid |  ePTTP(id-message) 
Step 3 : Now suppose an intermediate node B tries to get the key by sending the 
decrypted id_message dSB( id_N’) (it is not same as id_N).  
B            TTP : tid | dSB( id_N’) 
The TTP will not accept because id_message is not equal to id_message he received in 
step 2 from A. 
Step 4:  TTP            B : tid | Negative acknowledgement 
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Now consider messages with the recipient N. First the recipient N needs to identify itself. 
Step 5: id_N is first decrypted at the N using private key of the N: dSN(id_N). It is next 
encrypted using public key of the TTP and sent to the TTP.  
N          TTP : tid | ePTTP(id_message) 
Step 6:  TTP            N : Positive acknowledgement 
Step 7:  The recipient N sends double encrypted key and signature1 to the TTP 
N            TTP : t id | A | N | md1 | md3 | dek | sSN(t id | md1 | md3) 
Step 8: TTP decrypts the double encrypted key and sends encrypted key to the recipient 
N. 
TTP             N : t id | ek_from_TTP 
Where, ek_from_TTP = dSTTP(dek) : decryption of dek using private key of TTP. 
Step 9: The recipient N sends his signature2 on a digested secret key to the TTP. 
N          TTP : t id | sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) 
Step 10: TTP sends both signatures to the originator A. 
TTP           A : t id | sSN(t id | md1 | md3 ) | sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) 
Requirements: 
In this section we give an informal analysis on how our protocol satisfies the 
requirements of a chain of Business Transactions. 
Requirement 1: Intermediate nodes cannot get the key from the TTP because of id_N. 
Requirement 2: How does the originator A know that the recipient N gets message? It is 
because of md3 in the recipient N’s signature. 
Requirement 3: How does the originator A know that message is correct? It is because of 
md1 in the recipient N’s signature. 
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Requirement 4: How does the originator A know that the key is delivered correctly? It is 
because of the signature of the recipient N on the digested secret key i.e. 
sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) . 
Requirement 5: How does N know that this message is from the originator A? The 
recipient N checks the integrity of message using treble signature. It is the only sender 
that can generate that signature. 
4.6.2 Petri Net Model of Non-repudiation chain-linked Protocol: 
The protocol is modeled in figure 4.4. It started with the place p1 and ended with 
the final place p12. Each process task is represented by a transition [18]. There is a token 
in p1 thus t1, which represents process A, is the only enabled transition. Firing t1 
consumes the tokens in p1 and produced tokens in p2 and p6 then t2, which represents 
process B, is enabled. Transition t5 is not enabled at this time because it required the 
token in p5. Firing t2 consumes the tokens in p2 and produced new tokens in p3 and p13, 
and then t3 and t11 are enabled. Transition t12 represents the negative acknowledgment 
from the TTP to the process B when it tried to access message. Now t3, which is process 
C, is enabled. Firing t3 consumes tokens in p3 and produced tokens in p4. This process 
continues until message reaches the recipient N. Figure 4.4 shows the process N as a 
transition t4 and is enabled as p4 contain tokens. On firing t4 it produced tokens in p5. 
Now p6 and p5 contain tokens so transition t5, which represents process TTP, is enabled. 
It guarantees the correct execution of parallel tasks [18]. If t5 fires, both tokens in p6 and 
p5 are consumed and a token is produced in p7. Now transition t6 is enabled. On firing, it 
consumed tokens from p7, which is a positive acknowledgment from the TTP process to 
the recipient N, and tokens are produced in p8. This process continued until t10 is fired, 
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which is process A, to get both signatures from TTP and produced tokens in p12. It means 
























                                                                                    p1  
                                                                                 t1             Process A 
                 p2                                          
                      
                                                                                  t2             Process B 
                                                                                                  
                                                                                   p3                     p13
                                                                                   t3            Process C             t11              Process TTP 
                                 p6                       
                                                                                   p4                                          p14
                                                                
                                                                                  t4             Process N               t12            Process B   
 
                                                                                 p5                                           p15
                                                                                  t5             Process TTP 
                                                              
                                                                                  p7
                                                              
                                                                                  t6             Process N   
                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                  p8
                                                                                   t7            Process TTP                                                                          
                                                                                  p9                                                                
                                                                                   t8             Process N 
                                                                                p10
                                                    t9            Process TTP 
                                                                                 p11
                                                                                 t10              Process N 
                                                                      p12                         
 
Figure 4.6: Case1; Petri Net Model of Chain Linked Business Transaction 
 37
4.6.3 Dispute Resolution: 
Two kinds of disputes can come up [23]: repudiation of origin and repudiation of 
recipient. Repudiation of recipient arises when the originator A claims having sent a 
message to the recipient N, who denies having received it. Repudiation of origin arises 
when the recipient N claims having received the message from the originator A, who 
denies having sent it.  
Repudiation of Recipient: 
If the recipient N denies receiving message ‘M’, the originator A can present 
evidence in the form of signatures of N plus (tid, em, dek, id_message, md1, md2, md3, 
K, M, PTTP, PN, ek_from_TTP) to arbitrator. The arbitrator will compare the tid and check  
em = eK(M) 
md1= MD(em) 




Message digest of ek_from_TTP 
N’s signatures sSN(t id | md1 | md3), and sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) 
TTP’s signature dSTTP(dek) and its log information to get signature. 
The originator A will win the dispute if all the checks are positive. Originator A 
will win even if he is unable to provide log information of the TTP as in last check. So it 
is not required the presence of the TTP at the time of dispute. 
Repudiation of Origin: 
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If  the originator A denies sending the message ‘M’, the recipient N can present 
evidence in the form of treble signature of A plus (tid, em, dek, md1, md2, md3, K, M, 
ek_from_TTP) to the arbitrator. The arbitrator will compare the tid and check  
em = eK(M)  
md1 = MD(em) 
dek = ePTTP(ek_from_A) 
ek_from_A = ePN(K) 
md2= MD(dek) 
md3 = MD(id_N) 
A’s signature sSA(t id | md1 | md2 | md3) 
TTP’s signature dSTTP(dek) 
Recipient N will win the dispute if all the checks are positive. 
4.6.4 Security Requirements: 
Important requirements of non-repudiation services are fairness, timeliness, 
protection and confidentiality. 
Fairness of Protocol: 
A non-repudiation protocol provides fairness if neither party can gain an 
advantage by quitting premature or misbehaving during the execution of protocol [23]. 
If the protocol terminates at step 1 because of some problem in communication channel 
or misbehavior of the intermediate node, the originator loss nothing. At this time, even 
intermediate nodes or the recipient N has an encrypted message em = eK(M) and double 
encrypted key dek = ePTTP(ek_from_S) but they cannot access the message until the TTP 
decrypts the key. If any intermediate node tries to access secret key, first he needs to 
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identify himself by decrypting id_N and this is not possible because id_message is 
encrypted with public key of recipient N.  
The recipient N gets access to entire original message after step 8. After this step 
the recipient N can misbehave in two ways. Recipient N does not execute step 9. TTP 
detects the misbehavior of the receiver when timeout is reached and TTP does not receive 
N’s signature. In this case TTP sends sSN(t id | md1 | md3) and ek_from_TTP  to the 
originator A. Originator A proves the misbehavior by presenting tid, em, id_message and 
dek and showing that em and id_message are matched to the message digest in sSN(t id | 
md1 | md3) and dek is matched to the ek_from_TTP. 
Recipient N can also misbehave by deliberately signing on a fake key in step 9 to 
reject the transaction later. In this case the originator A can prove the dishonesty of the 
recipient by showing that key sent at step 1 matched with ek_from_TTP at step 8 but not 
to the signature2 of the N in step 9. 
The protocol also prevents the originator A from sending an invalid message or 
denying sending a message. In the final step, the originator A can get a receipt in the 
form of digital signature. However, final step cannot be reached if the originator A has 
sent an invalid message because the receiver N can check the integrity of message by 
comparing the message digest of the encrypted message and double encrypted key with 
the treble signature. If the recipient N did not receive the encrypted message and double 
encrypted key correctly, he would not give the signature1. Recipient N would not send 
the second signature if he cannot access the encrypted message using the secret key. In 
court, N can presents that key and message digest of the key that he received in treble 
signature and showing that the key corresponds to the its message digest but unable to 
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unlock the message. There is no way that the originator A can denies having sent 
message and double encrypted key because of the treble signature. If originator A denies 
from these encrypted message and double encrypted key and claims that he sent different 
message and double encrypted key (which is different from original encrypted message 
and double encrypted message received by N), the recipient N can clear his position and 
disprove that claim by showing treble signature on message digest of em, dek and id_N 
that has been received. 
Consider the situation when the TTP and the originator team up to get the 
recipient N in trouble. On receiving the double encrypted key, TTP does not send the 
encrypted key to the receiver and claims that he did. Now the recipient already has the 
treble signature so that he can have partial evidence on the double encrypted key. TTP 
cannot argue that he gave the encrypted key to the recipient, because the recipient would 
not give the second signature until he gets the encrypted key.   
Protection and integrity of Message: 
This protocol protects the involved parties from common message protection 
threats such as message interception and modification, and reply attacks. We used 
message digest and encryption techniques to protect the message from interception and 
modification. The integrity of message can be verified by comparing with the message 
digest value. Protection is provided by encrypting a message with a key which is double 
encrypted so that no one but recipient can access the message content. The protocol 
generates a new transaction id (tid) every time to protect from replay attacks [15]. 
Confidentiality of transaction: 
 41
The protocol provides the confidentiality so that, except the recipient no one else 
including the TTP can access the original contents of the message. The recipient needs to 
identify itself by sending id_message to TTP. Although the intermediate nodes are 
involved in the communication, they cannot access the message. The only way to read the 
message is through the secret key that encrypts the message. The secret key is double 
encrypted to prevent the intermediaries and TTP from getting access to the key and hence 
the original message. In step 9 the recipient signs the message digest of the secret key but 
not the secret key itself so that TTP does not know the key, even though it is involved in 
the protocol. 
Timeliness: 
The Protocol achieves timeliness as each involved party can terminate the 
protocol at any time at their own judgment while maintaining fairness [23]. If the 
protocol terminates after step 1, the recipient N cannot take any advantage because it 
cannot access the message even it gets the treble signature. If it terminates at step 2 and 
step 3 or step 4 and step 5, nobody can claim any thing because these are only 
identification messages. If it ends at step 7, the originator A cannot claim anything 
because the recipient N has yet to sign on the digested secret key. If the protocol ends at 
step 8, the recipient N cannot take any advantage because of his signature over the 
encrypted message and log information over the key are available to the TTP when 
executing step 7. If protocol terminates at step 9 and before step 10, the originator A can 
contact the TTP later to get both signatures.   
4.6.5 Building the BPEL Processes; Case 1: 
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For the BPEL specification we consider only one intermediate node in the above 
protocol. For more intermediate nodes, the BEPL specification for the intermediate nodes can 
be simply replicated for each intermediate node. . We therefore need only four processes, one 
for supplier A, one for buyer N, one for intermediate party B and one for TTP. 
Supplier Process A: 
This process takes the request from the process B and sends request with double-
encrypted key to the intermediate process. The process A also sends id_message to the 
process TTP. Finally it receives signatures from the TTP process. So there are three partners 
in this transaction - Supplier A, intermediate node B and TTP. First we define partners and 
containers to store data. 
After defining the partners and containers of the process, we need to define 
activities of the process starting from sequence of process. 
Begin sequence 
• Receive a request from the intermediate node.  
• Invoke a process to produce encrypted id_message, encrypted message and 
double encrypted key. 
• Assign the data to the container to be sent to intermediate node. 
• Reply the intermediate node to send message. 
• Assign encrypted id_message to a container. 
• Invoke the process TTP and send encrypted id_message. 




Intermediate Process B: 
The sequence of activities at intermediate process is as follow: 
Begin sequence 
• Invoke the buyer process to send request of purchase.  
• Receive the information from supplier process. 
• Invoke the buyer process to send that information. 
End sequence 
Buyer Process N: 
The sequence of activities is as follow: 
• Receive the information from intermediate node. 
• Assign the id_message to the container to be use in the invoke activity. 
• Invoke the process TTP and send the id_message. 
• Receive the acknowledgement from the process TTP. 
• Assign double encrypted key and signature1 to the container. 
• Reply to the process TTP and send double encrypted key and signature1. 
• Receive encrypted key from the process TTP. 
• Reply the process TTP and send the signature2. 
End sequence 
Process TTP: 
The fourth BPEL process place at the TTP and its sequence of activities is as follow: 
Begin sequence 
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• Receive id_message from the supplier process A. 
• Receive id_message from the buyer process N. 
• Invoke internal process to compare id_message for identification. 
• Reply with the acknowledgement to the buyer process N. 
• Receive double encrypted key and signature1 from buyer process. 
• Reply with encrypted key to the buyer process. 
• Receive the signature2 from the buyer process. 
• Reply the supplier process to send the signatures of the buyer process. 
End sequence 
4.7 Chain linked Non-repudiation protocol for Modified Messages; Case 2: 
The protocol presented in Section 4.7 established non-repudiation in chain linked 
business transactions where intermediate node cannot access and modify the messages. 
However, in some scenarios there are some transactions in which intermediate nodes may 
need to add their own information to the message.   
Example Scenario: 
A given product is created by merging two products from different producers A 
and C.  Producer A is sent the purchase order from the buyer N.   
• Producer A accepts the order and sends the order fulfillment note to the buyer’s 
preferred shipper B.  Producer A has included the price in the order fulfillment 
note and does not want anyone else to know this price.  It is also critical that no 
one else modify this price. Included is the number of units to be produced, 
shipping data of products (size, weight etc) and dates for shipment. 
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• Shipper B read his own contents e.g. shipping date, weight, and size etc. and sent 
information (including shipping) to the producer C.  
• Producer C sends a note to the shipper B on when the complete order will be 
available and other information. Included also is the price that only Buyer N 
should read. 
• Shipper B sends a note to the buyer N with price to ship final product to the buyer 
from the producer C. 
• Buyer N receives order fulfillment note.  
Flow for this chain linked scenario is as follow. 
 
 
           A                  B                C                 B                                               N 
Issues: 
• How does the recipient N know that intermediate node access only those pieces of 
the message that they should modify? 
• How does N know that intermediate nodes did modify the pieces they were 
supposed to change? 
• How does A know that message did get to the recipient N and intermediate nodes 
did make appropriate changes? etc. 
We propose a new non-repudiation protocol for chain linked business transactions 
in which intermediate nodes can add their information in the message. 
4.7.1 Design and Approach: 
We divide the message into two different portions.  
 46
1. Segment that cannot be seen or modified by any intermediate node e.g. price of 
product from any producer. We encrypt this segment of message with a double 
encrypted key.  
2. Segment that is viewable to the particular intermediate node e.g. shipping date, 
size and weight etc. We encrypt this segment of message with public key of 
particular intermediate node. 
The protocol works as follow.                
Where K : a symmetric key generated by A 
t id : transaction id 
em(A) = eK(mA) 
ek_from_A = ePN(KA)  dek(A) = ePTTP(ek_from_A) 
md1 = MD(em(A))  md2 = MD(dek(A))  md3 = MD(id_N) 
md4=MD(em(C))  md5=MD(em(B)) 
id_N = ePN(id-message)  em_for_B = ePB(M) 
id_TTP = ePTTP(id-message) 
treble signature = t id | md1 | md2 | md3 | sSA(t id | md1 | md2 | md3) 
Step 1: The originator A sends encrypted id-message, encrypted message (this segment is 
encrypted with a double encrypted key), double encrypted key, treble signature and 
encrypted message to B (this segment is encrypted with a public key of B). 
A             B :  t id | A | B | N | id_N | em(A) | dek(A) | treble signature | em_for_B 
Step 2:   The originator A encrypts the id-message with public key of the TTP and sends 
it to the TTP.    
A             TTP: tid | ePTTP (id-message) 
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Step 3: The intermediate node B decrypts message M using its private key and sent an 
encrypted message (encrypted with a public key of C) to the Producer C. 
B        C: tid | ePC(message) 
Step 4: The producer C gets the information and sends an encrypted message, double 
encrypted key, dual signature and encrypted message (encrypted with a public key of B) 
to the shipper B. 
em(C) = eK(mC)      ek_from_C = ePN(KC) dek(C) = ePTTP(ek_from_C) 
C B : t id | C | B | N | em_for_B | em(C) | dek(C) | Dual_signature_from_C                              
 
Figure 4.7: Non-repudiation protocol for chain-linked business transaction with message 
modification. 
Step 5: The shipper B gets the information and forwards message from A (encrypted 
message , double encrypted key, id-message and treble signature), message from C 
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(encrypted message, double encrypted key and dual signature), and sends his own 
encrypted message, double encrypted key and dual signature to the Buyer N. 
em(B) = eK(mB)      ek_from_B = ePN(KB) dek(B) = ePTTP(ek_from_B) 
B          N :  t id | B | N | em(A) | dek(A) | treble signature | em(C) | dek(C) | id_N | 
Dual_signature_from_C | em(B) | dek(B) | Dual_signature_from_B 
Step 6: id_N is first decrypted at N using private key of N: dSN(id_N). It is next 
encrypted using public key of TTP and sent to the TTP.  
N         TTP : tid | ePTTP( id_message) 
Step 7:  TTP            N : tid | Positive acknowledgement. 
Step 8: The recipient N sends Signature1, double encrypted key from A, double 
encrypted key from C, and double encrypted key from B to the TTP. 
N            TTP : t id | A | N | md1 | md3 | md4 | md5 | dek(A) | dek(C) | dek(B) | sSN(t id | 
md1 | md3 |  md4 | md5) 
Step 9: TTP decrypts the double encrypted keys and sends the encrypted keys to N. 
TTP          N : t id | eks_from_TTP 
Step 10: The recipient N sends its signature2 on the digested secret keys to TTP. 
N          TTP : t id | sSN(MD(eks_from_TTP)) 
Step 11: TTP forwards both signatures to the producer A which then forward it to the 
shipper B and producer C. 
TTP           A : t id | sSN(t id | md1 | md3 | md4 | md5 ) | sSN(MD(eks_from_TTP)) 
Requirements:  
In this section we give an informal analysis on how our protocol satisfies the 
requirements for a chain of Business Transactions. 
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Requirement 1: How can the buyer N be guaranteed that the price it gets is indeed what 
was input by producer A (or C)?Buyer N checks the integrity of message from A using 
treble signature and from C and B using their dual signature. These are the only senders 
that can generate these signatures. 
Requirement 2: Intermediate node cannot get the key and hence the message from TTP 
because of ePN( id_message). 
Requirement 3: How can the A, B and C are guaranteed that buyer N did get the correct 
information and it was not tampered or read by any of the intermediate notes? It is 
because of md1, md4 and md5 respectively in N’s signature. 
Requirement 4: How can the producer A be guaranteed that the information was not 
transmitted to a potential competitor (e.g. Producer C may have a preferred partner and 
may send some of the product details to this partner)? A encrypts the confidential 
information with a double encrypted key and no one can get access to key without 
identifying himself.  
Color Petri Net: 
Definition: A colored Petri Net (CPN) is a tuple CPN = (PN, ∑, CR, E) [20] where 
1. PN = (P, N, F, M) in an ordinary Petri net, 
2. ∑ = {σ1, σ2, …} is a finite set of colors, 
3. CR is color factor such that CR(p) ⊆  ∑, and CR(m(p)) ⊆ CR(P) (see glossary for 
more explanation), and 
4. E, the arc function such that: ∀f (p, t), f(t, p) ∈ F, Ef  ⊆ CR(p)MS (see glossary for 
more explanation) 
4.7.2 Color Petri Net Based Model of Case 2: 
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We prefer color Petri Net to model Non-repudiation protocol as intermediate node 
can modify messages and it is simple to flow the each message along the whole chain.    
Buyer N sent the purchase order to the Producer A, so token with color ‘a’ starts 
instance in place p1. 
 Place  Process 
Transition  Method  
Token  Data 
Step1: 
                                        p1                             t1                                  p2
 
 




C(p1) = a C(p2) = {b, c, e, f, g}  C(p3) = d 
E f (p1, t1) = a  E f (t1, p2) = b + c + e + g + f   E f (t1, p3) = d 
Where,  a = start instance b = dek(A) c = em_for_B   d = id_TTP 
  e = id_N f = treble signature  g = em(A) 
Consider the CPN, there are three places p1, p2 and p3 and a transition t1 such that 
the color set of p1, p2 and p3 are CR(p1) = {a}, CR(p2) = {b, c, e, g, f}, and CR(p3) = {d}, 
respectively.  So p1 is initially marked with token ‘a’ to represent token of color ‘a’. The 
arc function associated with the three arcs f (p1, t1), f (t1, p2), and ƒ (t1, p3) are E f (p1, t1) 
= a, E f (t1, p2) = b + c + e + g + f, and E f ( t1, p3) = d, respectively, meaning that enabling t1, 
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which represents a method at process A, needs a token of color ‘a’ and firing t1 produces 
tokens of color b, c, e, f, and g in place p2 and token of color ‘d’ in place p3. Since E f (p1, 
t1) ≤ m(p1) (i.e. a  ≤ a ) so t1 is enabled. We are following the notations as in [20] 
Step2: 
                                        p2                             t2                                  p4
 
 
                                                                                                                p5
 
 
C(p2) = {b, c, e, f, g}  C(p4) = {b, e, f, g} C(p5) = h 
E f (p2, t2) = b + c + e + f + g   E f (t2, p4) = b + e + f + g E f (t2, p5) = h 
Where,  h = ePc(message) 
Since E f (p2, t2) ≤ m(p2) (i.e. b + c + e + f + g  ≤ b + c + e + f + g ) so t2 is enabled. Firing t2, 
which represents a method at process B, produces tokens of color b, e, f, and g in place p4 
and token of color ‘h’ in place p5. 
Step3: 
                                        p5                             t3                                  p6
 
 
C(p5) = h  C(p6) = {o, q, r, s} 
E f (p5, t3) = h E f (t3, p6) = o + q + r + s  
Where,  o = em(C) q = dek(C) r = Dual_signature_from_C 
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  s = em_for_B  
Since E f (p5, t3) ≤ m(p5) (i.e. h  ≤ h ) so t3 is enabled. Firing t3, which represents a method at 
process C, produces tokens of color o, q, r, and s in place p6. 
Step 4: 
                                        p4                             t4                                  p7
 
 
                                  p6
 
 
C(p4) = {b, e, f, g} C(p6) = {o, q, r, s} C(p7) = {e, b, g, f, k, i, n, o, q, r} 
E f (p4, t4) = b + e + g + f  E f (p6, t4) = o + q + r + s  
E f (t4, p7) = b + e + f + k + i + n + o + q + r 
Where,  k = em(B)  i = dek(B) n = Dual_signature_from_B 
Since E f (p4, t4) ≤ m(p4) and E f (p6, t4) ≤ m(p6) so t4 is enabled. Firing t4, which represents a 
method at process B, produces tokens of color e, b, g, f, k, i, n, o, q, and r in place p7. 
Step5: 
                                        p7                             t5                                  p8
 
 
C(p7) = {e, b, g, f, k, i, n, o, q, r} C(p8) = u 
E f (p7, t5) = e E f (t5, p8) = u  
Where,  u = ePTTP(id_message) 
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Since E f (p7, t5) ≤ m(p7) (i.e. e ≤ e + b + g + f + k + i + n + o + q + r ) so t5 is enabled. 
Firing t5, which represents a method at process N, produces a token of color ‘u’ in place 
p8. 
Step 6: 
                                        p3                             t6                                  p9
 
 
                                  p8
 
 
C(p3) = d C(p8) = u C(p9) = v 
E f (p3, t6) = d E f (p8, t6) = u  E f (t6, p9) = v 
Where,  v = positive acknowledgement from the TTP 
Since E f (p3, t6) ≤ m(p3) and E f (p8, t6) ≤ m(p8) so t6 is enabled. Firing t6, which represents a 
method at process TTP, produces a token of color ‘v’ in place p9. 
Step 7: 
                                        p9                             t7                                  p10
 
 
                                  p7
 
 
C(p9) = v C(p7) = {b, g, f, k, i, n, o, q, r} C(p10) = {b, q, i, w}  
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E f (p9, t7) = v   E f (p7, t7) = b + q + i E f (t7, p10) = b + q + i + w 
Where,  w = sSN(t id | md1 | md3 | md4 | md5) 
Since E f (p7, t7) ≤ m(p7) and E f (p9, t7) ≤ m(p9) so t7 is enabled. Firing t7, which represents a 
method at process N, produces tokens of color b, q, i, and w in place p10. 
Step8: 
                                        p10                             t8                                  p11
 
 
C(p10) = {b, q, i, w} C(p11) = x 
E f (p10, t8) = b + q + i  E f (t8, p11) = x   
Where,  u = eks_from_TTP 
Since E f (p10, t8) ≤ m(p10) (i.e. b + q + i ≤ b + i + q + w ) so t8 is enabled. Firing t8, which 
represents a method at process TTP, produces a token of color ‘x’ in place p11. 
Step 9: 
                                        p11                             t9                                  p12
 
 
                                  p7
 
 
C(p11) = x C(p7) = {g, f, k, n, o, r} C(p12) = y  
E f (p7, t9) = g + k + o    E f (p11, t9) = x  E f (t9, p12) = y 
Where,  y = sSN(MD(eks_from_TTP)) 
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Since E f (p11, t9) ≤ m(p11) and E f (p7, t9) ≤ m(p7) (i.e. g + k + o  ≤ g + f + k + n + o + r) so t9 
is enabled. Firing t9, which represents a method at process N, produces tokens of color ‘y’ 
in place p10. 
Step 10: 
                                        p12                             t10                                  p13
 
 
                                  p10
 
 
C(p12) = y C(p10) = w C(p13) = {w, y}  
E f (p12, t10) = y   E f (p10, t10) = w  E f (t10, p13) = w + y 
Since E f (p12, t10) ≤ m(p12) (i.e. y ≤ y) and E f (p10, t10) ≤ m(p10) (i.e. w ≤ w) so t10 is enabled. 
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Figure 4.8: Case2; Color Petri Net Model of Chain Linked Business Transaction 
4.7.3 Reliability of Non-repudiation Protocol for Chain-Linked 
Transactions: 
In this section, we show that if any transaction does not take place due to communication 
failures or node misbehavior, the protocol will terminate.  
Definition 1:  
 Given a CPN, we define the number of distinct color associated with a place pi as 
ui = | C(pi) |. [20] 
Definition 2: 
 Given a CPN, we define the number of ways in which a transition ti can fire as vi 
= the number of consistent substitutions of each arc function f(pj, ti) (the condition to be 
satisfied for the transition to fire) with the elements in C(pj), where pj є •ti. [20] 
We can regard a colored Petri net as continuous time homogeneous Markov process and 
we can analyze the system reliability by means of analytic method [22]. 
Definition 3: 
 System is reliable if and only if each input and output function of all transitions 
are reliable. Where, reliability of the system is denoted by R(system) 
R(system) = R (I(tj)) AND R (O(tj)) 
R(system) = R (f(pi, tj)) AND R(f(tj, pk)) 
Now first consider R (f(pi, tj)), where pi є •tj (set of input places of tj) 
Unfolding the CPN as follow [20]: 
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For each place pi in CPN, create as many places as ui and label them with color σ1, 
σ2, σ3 ……, σu and for each transition tj in CPN create as many transitions as vj and give 
them distinct label to each. 
Now draw the edges from every place derived from pi to every transition tj with 
arc function E f (pi, tj) and substitute σk in E f (pi, tj) with logical 1 which ensure a correct 
execution of tj, so 
       u 
R (f(pi, tj)) = ∏  E f (pi, tj)
                                                                          i=1 
 
Now consider R(f(tj, pk)), where pk є tj• (set of output places of tj) 
For each place pk in CPN, create as many places as uk and label them with color 
σ1, σ2, σ3 ……, σk and for each transition tj in CPN create as many transitions as vj and 
give them distinct label. 
Now draw the edges from every transition derived from tj to every transition pk 
with arc function E f (tj, pk) and substitute σk in E f (tj, pk) with logical 1 which ensure a 
correct execution of tj, so 
       u 
R (f(tj, pk)) = ∏  E f (pi, tj)
                                                                          i=1 
Hence; 
R(system) = R (f(pi, tj)) AND R(f(tj, pk)) 
This shows that in the colored Petri net a transition may not fire properly (due to 
communication failure or misbehaving nodes). We assume that the Petri Net is live. If a 
transition does not fire, then the liveness property is no longer true and this will terminate 
the system. 
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4.7.4 Dispute Resolution: 
There are two kinds of disputes in this protocol: repudiation of origin and 
repudiation of receipt. Repudiation of receipt arises when the senders claim having sent a 
message to the recipient N, who denies having received it. Repudiation of origin arises 
when the recipient N claims having received a message(s) from the sender(s), who denies 
having sent the message(s).  
Repudiation of Recipient: 
If the recipient N denies receiving messages mA, mB, and mC, entity A, B and C 
can present evidence in the form of signatures of N plus (tid, em(A), em(B), em(C), 
dek(A), dek(B), dek(C), id_message, md1, md3, md4, md5, K, mA, mB, mC, PTTP, PN, 
eks_from_TTP) to arbitrator. The arbitrator will compare the tid and check  
em(A) = eK(mA)  em(B) = eK(mB)  em(C) = eK(mC) 
md1 = MD(em(A)) md3 = MD(em(id_N)) md4 = MD(em(B)) 
md5 =MD(em(C)) 
ek_from_A = ePN(KA) dek(A) = ePTTP(ek_from_A) 
ek_from_C = ePN(KC) dek(C) = ePTTP(ek_from_C) 
ek_from_B = ePN(KB) dek(B) = ePTTP(ek_from_B) 
Message digest of eks_from_TTP 
N’s signatures sSN(t id | md1 | md3 |  md4 | md5), and sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) 
TTP’s signatures dSTTP(dek(A)), dSTTP(dek(B)) and dSTTP(dek(C)),and its log information 
to get signature. 
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Senders A, B and C will win the dispute if all the checks are positive. Senders will 
win even if it is unable to provide log information of TTP as in last check. So it is not 
required the presence of TTP at the time of dispute. 
Repudiation of Origin: 
If A, B and C denies sending messages mA, mB, and mC respectively, the N can 
present evidence in the form of treble signature of A, double signature of B and double 
signature of C plus (tid, em(A), em(B), em(C), dek(A), dek(B), dek(C), md1, md3, md4, 
md5, KA, KB, KC, mA, mB, mC, eks_from_TTP) to arbitrator. The arbitrator will compare 
the tid and check  
em(A) = eK(mA)  em(B) = eK(mB)  em(C) = eK(mC) 
md1 = MD(em(A)) md3 = MD(em(id_N)) md4 = MD(em(B)) 
md5 =MD(em(C)) 
ek_from_A = ePN(KA) dek(A) = ePTTP(ek_from_A) 
ek_from_C = ePN(KC) dek(C) = ePTTP(ek_from_C) 
ek_from_B = ePN(KB) dek(B) = ePTTP(ek_from_B) 
A’s signature sSA(t id | md1 | md2 | md3) B’s Dual signature  C’s Dual signature  
TTP’s signatures dSTTP(dek(A)), dSTTP(dek(B)) and dSTTP(dek(C)) 
Recipient N will win the dispute if all the checks are positive. 
4.7.5 Security Requirements: 
Important security requirements are as follow. 
Fairness of Protocol: 
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This protocol has the ability to send messages from involved entities to the 
recipient N and also among involved entities using the double encrypted key and PKI 
respectively without the loss of fairness. 
There is no violation of fairness if the protocol ends at step1, step 4 and step 5 
because of any misbehavior or miscommunication. At this time the intermediate nodes or 
the recipient N has an encrypted messages and double encrypted keys but they cannot get 
access to those messages until TTP decrypt the key. If any intermediate node tries to get 
access to the secret key, he needs to identify himself by decrypting id_message and this is 
not possible because id_message is encrypted with public key of the recipient N. 
 The recipient N gets access to the entire original message after step 9. After this 
step N can misbehave in two ways. Recipient N does not take step 10. TTP detects the 
misbehavior of the recipient when timeout has been reached and TTP does not receive the 
recipient N’s signature. In this case TTP sends sSN( t id | md1 | md3 |  md4 | md5 ) and 
eks_from_TTP  to the A. The originator A proves the misbehavior by presenting t id, 
em(s), id_message and dek(s) and showing that the em(s) and the id_message are 
matched to sSN( t id | md1 | md3 |  md4 | md5 ) and dek(s) are matched to eks_from_TTP. 
The recipient N can also misbehave by deliberately signing on a fake key in step 
10 to reject the transaction later. In this case the originator A can show dishonesty of the 
recipient by showing that the keys sent at step 1, step 4, and step5 are matched with 
eks_from_TTP at step 9 but not with the signature2 of the N in step 10. 
The protocol also prevents the originator A or intermediate nodes from sending an 
invalid message or denying sending a message. In the final step, sender can get a receipt 
in the form of digital signature. However, final step cannot be reached if the originator A 
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or intermediate nodes has sent an invalid message because the recipient N can check the 
integrity of message by comparing the message digest of encrypted messages and double 
encrypted keys with the their signatures. If the recipient N did not receive the encrypted 
message and double encrypted key correctly, it would not give the first signature. The 
Recipient N would not send the second signature if it cannot access the encrypted 
messages with the secret keys. In court, the recipient N can present these keys, message 
digests of keys that he received and signatures of the originators. There is no way that the 
originator A or intermediate nodes can deny having sent message or double encrypted 
keys because of their signatures. If they deny from these encrypted messages or double 
encrypted keys and claim that they sent different encrypted messages and double 
encrypted keys (which is different from the original encrypted messages and double 
encrypted keys received by the recipient N), the recipient N can clear his position and 
disprove their claim by showing their signatures on em(s), dek(s) and id_N that has been 
received. 
Consider the situation when the TTP and the originator team up against the 
recipient N. On receiving the double encrypted key, TTP does not send the encrypted key 
to the receiver and claims it did. Now the receiver already gets the signatures of senders 
so that it can have partial evidence on the double encrypted key. The TTP cannot argue 
that it gave encrypted key without giving it to the receiver, because the receiver would 
not give the second signature until it get the encrypted key.    
Protection and integrity of Message: 
In this protocol there are two types of message, one is only for the recipient N and 
other is among the involved entities. We used PKI in order to protect the messages 
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among involved entities. Every entity sends the message to the recipient N and wants that 
no one else can access this message. This type of message is encrypted with the double 
encrypted key.    
The protocol generates a new transaction id (tid) for every new transaction to 
protect from replay attacks. 
Confidentiality of transaction: 
The protocol provides the confidentiality so that, no one including the TTP can 
access the original contents of messages but the recipient N. The recipient N needs to 
identify itself by sending id_message to TTP. Even the intermediate nodes are involved 
in the protocol but cannot get access to the messages. The only way to access the 
messages is through the secret keys that encrypt the messages. 
Timeliness: 
Protocol achieves timeliness as each involved entity can terminate the protocol at 
any time at his own judgment while maintaining fairness. 
4.7.6 Building the BPEL Processes; Case 2: 
In above protocol there are five processes, two for the producer A and C, one for the 
shipper B, one for the buyer N, and one for the TTP. 
Producer Process A: 
The producer accepts the order and sends the information to the buyer’s preferred 
shipper B. The process A has two partners process B and Process TTP. The sequence of 
producer process A is as follow. 
Begin sequence 
• Invoke the process B and send all information. 
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• Invoke the process TTP to send the encrypted id_message. 
• Receive the signatures from TTP. 
• Send signatures to the process B. 
End sequence 
Shipper Process B: 
Sequence of the shipper process B is as follow. 
Begin sequence 
• Receive the message from the producer process A. 
• Invoke the producer process B and send message of the process A to the process C. 
• Receive the message from the producer process C. 
• Invoke the buyer process TTP to send all messages from the producer process A, all 
messages from the producer process C and its own message. 
• Receive the signature form the process A. 
End sequence 
Producer process C: 
Sequence of the producer process C is as follow: 
Begin sequence 
• Receive message from the shipper process B. 
• Invoke internal process to decrypt the message. 
• Reply to the shipper process B with information for the buyer process N. 
• Receive signatures of the buyer from the process B. 
End sequence 
Buyer Process N: 
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Sequence of the buyer process is as follow. 
Begin sequence 
• Receive the information from the shipper process. 
• Assign the id_message to the container to be use in the invoke activity. 
• Invoke the process TTP and send the id_message. 
• Receive the acknowledgement from the process TTP. 
• Assign double encrypted keys and signature1 to the container. 
• Reply to the process TTP and send the double encrypted keys and signature1. 
• Receive the encrypted keys from the process TTP. 
• Reply the process TTP and send signature2. 
End sequence 
Process TTP: 
The fourth BPEL process place at the TTP and its sequence of activities is as follow: 
Begin sequence 
• Receive id_message from the producer process A. 
• Receive id_message from the buyer process N. 
• Invoke internal process to compare id_message for identification. 
• Reply with the acknowledgement to the buyer process N. 
• Receive double encrypted keys and signature1 form the buyer process N. 
• Reply with encrypted key to the buyer process N. 
• Receive the signature2 from the buyer process N. 
• Reply the producer process A to send the signatures of the buyer process N. 
End sequence 
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4.8 Non-repudiation Protocol for Multiple Entities:  
The protocol presented in pervious sections established non-repudiation in chain 
linked business transactions. However, in real-time scenarios, messages (same or 
different) are sent to the multiple entities. There is a chance of communication bottleneck 
created at the TTP. We propose a multi-entities non-repudiation (MENR) protocol, as an 
extension of our non-repudiation protocol, such that the sender is able to send different or 
identical messages to multiple recipients using a single key. 
Actual Scenario: 
Producer A produces different products and needs to send different messages to 
multiple receivers. Producer A receives an order from a company to send different 
products to their different departments Ni. Producer A accepts the order and sends 
different order fulfillment note including the price, number of units, shipping data of 
products (size, weight etc) and dates for shipment to the relevant department and does not 
want anyone else to know this information. 






• What factors determine to which recipients should the originator A send the 
message and the key? 
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• What factors determine to which recipients should TTP send the encrypted key? 
• How does same key open different messages and no one else but the particular 
recipient can read message? 
• How does the originator A know that recipients get the key and hence the original 
message? etc.  
We propose a new non-repudiation protocol in which originator can send different 
messages to multiple nodes. 
4.8.1 Design and Approach: 
An extension by Kremer et al. [24] of a low weight notary protocol for two 
entities [3] is the first non-repudiation protocol in the literature dealing with multiple 
entities. This protocol supports a one-to-many topology in which the originator aims to 
send the same message to multiple recipients. This protocol broadcasts a message among 
several entities and provides evidence only to those entities who behave honestly during 
the protocol run, using the same key for encryption. Nevertheless, it is not possible to 
send different messages to different recipients [23]. We design an optimal protocol 
named MENR in which originator can send different message to multiple recipients using 
same key. 
Some useful notation in the protocol description is as follows. 
A  an originator 
Ni  set of intended recipients 
Ni’  subset of Ni that replied to A with the evidence of receipt 
Mi  message being sent from A to a recipient Ni 
ni  random value generated by A 
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vi  ePNi’(ni) : encryption of ni with Ni’’s public key 
k  key being selected by A 
Ki  k xor ni: a key for Ni’ use to decrypt message 
em  EKi(Mi): encrypted message for Ni’ with key Ki
ek_from_A = ePNi’(k) 
dek = ePTTP(ek_from_A) 
ek_from_TTP = dSTTP(dek) 
id_Ni’ message to identify Ni’
md1 MD(em): message digest of encrypted message 
md2 MD(dek): message digest of double encrypted key 
md3 MD(vi): message digest of encrypted ni 
md4 MD( id_Ni’ ): message digest of id_Ni’
Ni’’ = Ni – Ni’: a subset of Ni with which A wants to cancel the exchange 
Cancelreq sSA( tid | TTP | Ni’’): evidence of request of cancellation issued by the 
originator to the TTP 




Figure 4.9: Multiple-Entities Non-repudiation Protocol 
Step 1: Originator A broadcasts the encrypted message Mi and his signature on the 
message digest of the encrypted message to the Ni
A Ni :  t id | A | TTP | Ni | em | md1 | sSA(tid | md1) 
Step 2: The subset of the recipients wants to receive that message send their public key 
and signature on their own public key and message digest of the encrypted message. 
Ni’ A : t id | A | Ni’ | PNi’ | sSNi’ (tid | A | TTP | Ni’ | PNi’ | md1) 
Where Ni’ є Ni
Step 3: originator A sends id_Ni’ for identification of the Ni’, double encrypted key, 
signature and vi to the Ni’. 
A Ni’ : t id | A | TTP | Ni’ | vi | ePNi’(id_Ni’) | dek | md2 | md3 | sSA (tid | md2 | md3) 
Step 4: The originator A sends encrypted id_Ni’, signature on Ni’, and Cancelreq to the 
TTP in order to identify the recipients Ni’ and decrypt the key only for correct recipients. 
A TTP : t id | A | TTP | ePTTP(id_Ni’) | sSA (tid | Ni’ ) | Cancelreq
Step 5: The recipients Ni’ send the double encrypted key, signature and the id_Ni’ to the 
TTP. So the TTP first identify them and then decrypts the key. 
 70
Ni’ TTP :  t id | A | TTP | Ni’ | ePTTP(id_Ni’) | dek | md4 | sSNi’ (tid | md4 ) 
Step 6: The TTP checks the identification of each the recipient N and do actions as 
follow. 
TTP: FOR (all Ni’ є Ni) 
 IF ( N є Ni’  )  THEN    
       TTP N : tid | N | ek_from_TTP | sSA (tid | id_Ni’ ) | sSNi’ (tid | md4 ) | 
Retrieve signature sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) from N 
 ELSE  
        TTP Ni’’ : tid| Ni’’ | negative Acknowledgement | Cancelreq | CancelNi’’  
Step 7: The recipients Ni’ submit signature to the TTP on a digested secret key. 
Ni’ TTP : tid | sSNi’(MD(ek_from_TTP)) | sSNi’ (tid | md4 ) 
Step 8: Protocol ends when the originator A fetches signatures of all the recipients (Ni’) 
from the TTP. 
  A          TTP : tid | sSNi’(MD(ek_from_TTP)) | sSNi’ (tid | md4 )  
4.8.2 Dispute Resolution: 
As we have mentioned, two kinds of disputes can arise. Now we discuss their 
resolution. 
Repudiation of Recipient: 
If Ni denies receiving message ‘Mi’, A can present evidence in the form of 
signatures sSNi’ (tid | A | TTP | Ni’ | PNi’ | md1), sSNi’ (tid | md4) and 
sSNi’(MD(ek_from_TTP)) plus (tid, em, dek, id_Ni’, vi, ni, Mi, k, Ki, md1, md4, PTTP, PNi’, 
ek_from_TTP) to arbitrator. The arbitrator will compare the tid and check  
vi = ePNi’(ni)  
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Ki  = k xor ni  
ek_from_A =eP Ni’(k) 
dek = ePTTP(ek_from_A) 




Message digest of ek_from_TTP 
N’s signatures sSNi’ (tid | A | TTP | Ni’ | PNi’ | md1), sSNi’ (tid | md4) and 
sSNi’(MD(ek_from_TTP))  
TTP’s signature dSTTP(dek) and his log information to get signature. 
Sender A will win the dispute if all the checks are positive. Sender A will win 
even if he is unable to provide log information of TTP as a last check. So it is not 
required the presence of TTP at the time of dispute. The arbitrator may further interrogate 
Ni using Cancelreq and CancelNi’’ to check the cancellation list from A. 
Repudiation of Origin: 
If A denies sending message ‘Mi’, Ni can present evidence in the form of 
signatures sSA (tid | md1) and sSA (tid | md2 | md3) plus (tid, em, dek, id_Ni’, vi, ni, Mi, k, 
Ki, md1, md2, md3, PTTP, PNi’, ek_from_TTP) to arbitrator. The arbitrator will compare 
the tid and check  
vi = ePNi’(ni)  
Ki  = k xor ni  
ek_from_A =eP Ni’(k) 
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dek = ePTTP(ek_from_A) 




Message digest of ek_from_TTP 
A’s signatures sSA (tid | md1) and sSNi’ (tid | md2 | md3)   
TTP’s signature dSTTP(dek) 
Recipient N will win the dispute if all the checks are positive. 
4.8.3 Security Requirements: 
Important requirements of non-repudiation services are as follow. 
Fairness of Protocol: 
This protocol has the ability to send different messages to different entities using 
the same key for encryption without the loss of fairness. 
There is no breach of fairness if the protocol ends at step1 because of any 
misbehavior or miscommunication. The originator already sent the encrypted message 
em = EKi(Mi) but still holding the key ‘k’ and ‘ni’ which is use to decrypt that message. If 
any recipient other than accepted recipients tries to get access the secret key, he needs to 
identify himself by decrypting id_Ni’ and this is not possible because id_Ni’ is encrypted 
with public key of  the recipient Ni’. The recipient Ni’ gets access to entire original 
message after step 6. After this step Ni’ can misbehave in two ways. Recipient Ni’ does 
not take step 7. TTP detects the misbehavior of receiver when timeout has been reached 
and TTP does not receive recipient’s signature. In this case TTP sends sSNi’ (tid | md4) and 
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ek_from_TTP to the originator A. Originator A proves the misbehavior by presenting tid, 
em, id_ Ni’, PNi’, ni and dek and shows that ‘em’ is matched to the sSNi’ (tid | A | TTP | Ni’ | 
PNi’ | md1) and id_ Ni’ is matched to sSNi’ (tid | md4) and dek is matched to ek_from_TTP. 
Recipient Ni’ can also misbehave by deliberately signing on a fake key in step 7 to 
refuse the transaction later. In this case the originator A can proves dishonesty of receiver 
by showing that key sent at step 1 matched with ek_from_TTP at step 6 but not with the 
signature of the Ni’ in step 7. 
The protocol also prevents the originator A from sending an invalid message or 
denying sending a message. In the final step originator can get a receipt in the form of 
digital signature. However, final step cannot be reached if the originator A has sent an 
invalid message because the receiver Ni’ can check the integrity of message by comparing 
the message digest of encrypted message after step 1. If Ni’ did not receive the encrypted 
message correctly, he would not give the signature and public key. Recipient Ni’ can 
check the integrity of key by comparing the message digest of double encrypted key after 
step 3 and if there is some problem, he would not execute next step. Recipient Ni’ would 
not send the signature on digested key if he cannot access the encrypted message with the 
secret key. In court, the recipient N can presents that key and message digest of the key 
that he received in step 3 and show that key correspond to its message digest but unable 
to unlock the message. There is no way the originator A can deny having sent message 
and double encrypted key because of his signature. If originator A denies and claims that 
he sent different message and double encrypted key (which is different from original 
encrypted message and double encrypted message received by Ni’) to the recipient Ni’, 
the Ni’ can clear his position and disprove that claim by showing A’s signatures sSA (tid | 
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md1) on the ‘em’ and sSNi’ (tid | md2 | md3) on the dek and the id_ Ni’, that has been 
received. 
Now consider the case where the TTP and the originator team up against the recipient Ni’. 
If the TTP does not send the encrypted key to the receiver in step 6 and claims that he 
did. Now the recipient already got sSNi’ (tid | md2 | md3) so that he can have an evidence 
on the double encrypted key. TTP cannot argue that he gave the encrypted key without 
really giving it to the recipient, because recipient would not give 
sSNi’(MD(ek_from_TTP)) until he gets the encrypted key. 
If the recipient Ni’’ claims that he sent the public key and an acceptance to receive 
the message and did not get any response from the originator. Originator A can disprove 
it by showing the list of Ni’’, Cancelreq and TTP’s signature CancelNi’’ which show that the 
subset of Ni with which the exchange has been cancelled.  
Verifiability of Third Party:  
If the TTP misbehaves, resulting in the loss of fairness for an entity, the victim 
can show the reality in a dispute [23]. 
Confidentiality of transaction: 
The protocol provides the confidentiality so that, except the particular recipient no 
one else including the TTP can access the original contents of message. Even the Ni’’ 
involved in the protocol and get a chance to receive the encrypted message but he is 
unable to open it because he needs the key k and ni to decrypt that message. If the Ni’’ 
gets the key k from some other recipient but he cannot access the message because he 
needs ni to compute Ki.  
Protection and integrity of Message: 
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Protection and integrity of the message is provided in same way as in pervious 
protocols. Further protection is provided by generating different ‘ni’ and hence Ki for 
particular recipient Ni so that no one else can access the key Ki and hence the message 
even if he knows the key k. 
4.8.4 Efficiency: 
We compare our protocol with the one where an n-instance of a two-party 
protocol [20] is used in order to send different messages to the intended parties. For this 
comparison, we use the following operations: 
• encryption and decryption 
• signature generation and verification 
• modular equation computation 
• random numbers generation 
• store and fetch actions 
Depending on which algorithm is used for each of these operations, the bit 
complexity of each of the participants will change but the relation going between them 
remains. 
We denote [23]: 
 ≈ roughly equal 
> or < greater or smaller 






 TTP’s computation complexity 
n-instanced two parties Comparison Our Approach 
Decryption o >> Decryption of one key f n of keys 
 
Hence we can see in Table 1 that efficiency of the TTP is improved when it is 
generalized to multiple entities. 
Table 4.2 
 A’s computation complexity 
n-instanced two parties Comparison Our Approach 
Generating n keys >> Generating one key 
Double encrypting n keys >> Encrypting one key 
No generation of n  and i
encrypting it 
Generation of ni and 
encrypting it 
<< 
n signatures on message digest 
N dual signatures ≈ 
of em, dek and vi
No identification required << 
Ge d neration of id_ Ni’ an
encrypt it with PNi’
n fetches operation to get 
sSN(M TP)) 





Above table shows that A’s efficiency is improved. In n-instances of two parties 
protocol, the misbehavior of the recipients disclose when they already get the key and 
 77
hence the message. In this case all computations of the T ocol, 
the N can get the key only after identification which reduce
ightly increased because of er if 
the recipient and the originator have pervious strong rela he 
cret, then the identification and encryption of ni could be avoided in each protocol run 
though
TP get wasted. In our prot
s the loss.  
Computation of Ni’ sl  identification and ni, howev
tional and they may share t
se
 it should be still included in evidence. 
Table 4.3 
 N’s computation complexity 
n-instanced two parties Comparison Our Approach 
Signature sSNi’(tid | A | TTP | Ni’ 
| PNi’ | md1) 
Signature 1 = 
Signature 2 = 
sSNi’(MD(ek_from_TTP) 
Signature 
No signature on id_Ni’ < Signature on id_Ni’ < 
Obtained encrypted key
it 
rypted key from TTP 
 it to get k plus 
 Obtain enc
from TTP and decrypt < and decrypted
decrypt ni and compute Ki
 
Our protocol is extremely efficient such that it exchange different messages 
among multiple recipients using only one key for evid ing the 
computation for the originator and the TTP. We get this t increase 
in cost  and decryption of cient 
than any other two-party protocols, since it allow to ltiple 
ence distribution and reduc
new feature with sligh
 of public key encryption  ni and id_Ni’. This protocol is effi
 send different messages to mu
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entities in a confidential way as well as to cancel the pient Ni’’. 
In addition it provides timeliness, as each entity can terminate the protocol at any time 
while m
i
of the encrypted message to the recipient processes. 
Begin s
 waiting for suitable message to arrive or for a time 
so that originator can receive message from the recipients and 
n 
ted key, signature and vi to the recipient 
 Ni’ through the same channel of invoke activity. 
 Cancelreq. 
End seq
Recipient Process N: 
protocol for a group of reci
aintaining the fairness. 
4.8.5 Building BPEL processes for the MENR Protocol: 
In this protocol number of processes depend on the number of recipients 
participated in protocol. At least there are three processes with one recipient process, 
originator process and TTP process. 
Originator Process A: 
Originator process starts when he broadcasts the encrypted message M  and his 
signature on the message digest 
Sequence of originator process is as follow. 
equence 
• Invoke recipient processes to send encrypted message and signature. 
• Use pick construct that allows
out alarm to go off 
if he does not receive anything from any recipient with in that time out alarm the
originator process able to send cancel request to the TTP process. 
• Send encrypted id_Ni’, double encryp
processes
• Invoke the TTP process to send encrypted id_Ni’, signature on Ni’, and
• Receive signature from the TTP process. 
uence 
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Sequence of the recipient process is as follow. 
equence Begin s
• ature. 
the TTP process to send encrypted id_Ni’, double encrypted key, and 
• 




• crypted id_Ni’ , double encrypted key, and signature from the recipient 
ere id_Ni’ matches 
se send Cancelreq. So switch activity can be use to perform this step. 
construct so that if he does not receive anything from any of the 
TP process able to show misbehavior 
ipient process(es). 
• Receive encrypted message and signature from the originator process. 
Reply to the originator process with his public key and sign




Receive encrypted key from the TTP process. 
• Reply the
 se uence 
P rocess: 
Sequence of the TTP process is as follow. 
equence 
• Receive information from the originator process as shown in figure 4.7. 
Receive en
processes. 
• Reply to the recipient processes with the encrypted key if th
otherwi
• Use pick 
recipients with in that time out alarm then T
of the rec
• Reply to the originator process with the signatures of recipients. 
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End q
4.9 Non-repudiation Protocol for chain-linked Multiple Entities: 
 
linked ent 
inv i ferent 
messag
multi-e ENR) protocol, is the extension of our non-
rep a  multiple 
gh intermediate nodes. 
is 
 
We design an optimal protocol named CLMENR in which originator can send 
different message to multiple recipients and we are introducing intermediate node IN 
which does play the role of a hub and reducing load on the originator. 
 se uence 
The protocol presented in pervious sections established non-repudiation in chain
business transactions in which the originator can send a message to the recipi
olv ng some intermediate nodes. In some cases the originator needs to send dif
e to the recipients through the intermediate node. We propose a chain-linked 
ntities non-repudiation (CLM
udi tion protocols, such that the sender is able to send different to the
recipients throu
Actual Scenario: 
Scenario is same as in chain linked business transaction but supplier A wants to 
send different messages to multiple recipients and does not want anyone else to know th
information. 







4.9.1 Design and Approach: 
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Most of the notations are same as in MENR except following.  
Dual signature = t id | md1 | md2 | sSA(tid | md1| md2) 
md1 MD(em): message digest of encrypted message 
md2 MD(dek): message digest of double encrypted key 
md3 MD(vi): message digest of encrypted ni 
md4 MD( id_N ’ ): message digest of id_Ni’i
 
repudiation protocol 
ssage Mi, double encrypted key and dual 
ation to the Ni.  
ssage send their public key and 
of the encrypted message. 
 | PNi’ | md1) 
Step 4: The intermediate node IN forward these signatures plus encrypted id_Ni’ and his 
signature on md4 to the originator A. 
Figure 4.10: Chain-linked multiple entities Non-
Step 1: The Originator A send the encrypted me
signature to the IN. 
A IN :  t id | IN | A | TTP | Ni | em | dek | Dual signature 
Step 2: The intermediate node IN broadcasts all this inform
IN  Ni :  t id | IN | A | TTP | Ni | em | dek | Dual signature 
Step 3: The subset of recipients requests to receive that me
signature on their own public key and message digest 
Ni’ IN : t id | A | TTP| Ni’ | IN | PNi’ | sSNi’ (tid | A | TTP | Ni’
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IN  A : t id | A | Ni’ |  | ePA(id_Ni’) | md4 | sSIN (tid | md4) | sSNi’ (tid | A | TTP | Ni’ | PNi’ | 
md1) 
Step 5: The intermediate node IN sends encrypted id_Ni’ and his signature on md4 to the 
o the TTP first identify them and then decrypts the key. 
P checks the identification of each the recipient N and do actions as 
TTP N : tid | N | ek_from_TTP | vi | md3 | sSA (tid | md3 | md4 ) | 
SE  
sted secret key. 
recipients Ni’. 
IN Ni’ : t id | Ni’ | ePNi’(id_Ni’) | md4 | sSA (tid | md4) 
Step 6: The originator A sends vi, encrypted id_Ni’ , his signature on md3 and md4 and 
Cancelreq to the TTP in order to identify Ni’ and decrypt the key only for correct 
reci ts. pien
A TTP : t id | A | TTP | Ni’ | vi | md3 | md4 | ePTTP(id_Ni’) | sSA (tid | md3 | md4 ) | 
Cancelreq
Step7: The recipients Ni’ send the double encrypted key, signature and the id_Ni’ to the 
TTP. S
Ni’ TTP :  t id | A | TTP | Ni’ | ePTTP(id_Ni’) | dek | md4 | sSNi’ (tid | md4 ) 
Step 8: The TT
follow. 
TTP: FOR (all Ni’ є Ni) 
 IF ( N є Ni’  )  THEN    
       
Retrieve signature sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) from N 
 EL
        TTP Ni’’ : tid| Ni’’ | negative Acknowledgement | Cancelreq | CancelNi’’
Step 9: The recipients Ni’ submit signature to the TTP on a dige
Ni’ TTP : tid | A | TTP |sSNi’(MD(ek_from_TTP)) | sSNi’ (tid | md4 ) 
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D(ek_from_TTP)) | sSNi’ (tid | md4 )  
.9.2 B sses r the CLMENR Protocol: 
n the 
number of recipients participa  one 
inator process, intermediate process and TTP process. 
 
nature. 




  A          TTP : tid | sSNi’(M
4 uilding BPEL proce fo
In CLMENR protocol like MENR protocol, number of processes depend o
ted in protocol. At least there are four processes with
recipient process, orig
Originator Process A: 
Sequence of originator process is as follow. 
Begin sequence 
• Invoke intermediate process to send encrypted message, double encrypted key and
dual sig
• Receive encrypted id_Ni’, Ni’s signatures and IN’s signat
process. 
Invoke the TTP process to send encrypted id_Ni’, cancelreq and signature. 
• Receive signatures of recipient from the TTP process. 
End sequence 
Intermediate Process IN
uence of the intermediate process is as follow
Begin sequence 
• Invoke recipient processes to send encrypted message double encrypted key and 
dual signature. 
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• Use pick so that intermediate process can receive message from the recipients and 
if he does not receive anything from some of the recipients with in that time out 
ipients 
crypted id_Ni’, and IN’s signature to the recipient processes Ni’ through 
oke activity. 
 encrypted id_Ni’, signature on Ni’, 
n signature. 
End q
Recipient Process N: 
Begin s
• 
• nature from the intermediate process. 
 encrypted key from the TTP process. 
cess with his signature on digested key. 
End seq
Sequence of the TTP process is as follow. 
alarm then intermediate process able to send cancel request from those rec
to the originator process. 
• Send en
the same channel of inv
• Reply the originator process in order to send
and his ow
 se uence 
Sequence of the recipient process is as follow. 
equence 
Receive encrypted message, double encrypted key and dual signature from the 
intermediate process. 
• Reply to the intermediate process with his public key and signature. 
Receive encrypted id_Ni’ and IN’s sig
• Invoke the TTP process to send encrypted id_Ni’, double encrypted key, and 
signature. 
• Receive





• om the originator process as show in figure 4.8. 
he recipient 
s 
end cancelreq. So switch activity can be use to perform this step. 
e anything from any of the 
 to show misbehavior 
cipient process(es). 













• Receive encrypted id_Ni’, double encrypted key, and signature from t
processes. 
• Reply to the recipient processes with the encrypted key if there id_Ni’ matche
otherwise s
• Use pick construct so that if he does not receiv
recipients with in that time out alarm then TTP process able
of the re










In this era of globalization Web Services are considered as a future of internet. 
PEL is a way of integrating those web services in order to get the best, simple, and 
conomical service in B2C as well as in B2B transactions. With the increase of World 
ide Web usage it is necessary that there are some efficient and fair approaches of 
curity. Non repudiation is special technique in which the scope of the system is 
particularly wide, as it includes agents outside the communication exchange. Getting a 
protocol right involves taking account of many great possible loopholes. There are 
several publications that address Non-repudiation dilemma using various levels of trust 
and dependency on a third party and with different weaknesses. 
The Non-repudiation protocols developed and specified in BPEL are based on a 
protocol which possesses several new fferent scenarios. In our approach, 








 challenges in di
ted third party signature is not considered as evidence therefore TTP availability
is not required at the time of dispute resolution. We extended this protocol to some re
time scenarios. In chained linked transactions no one else but the recipient accesses the 
message because he needs to identify himself before proceeding. One of our propose
protocols has a uniqueness in which intermediate nodes can access message and m
according to the requirements. We also proposed a protocol that has an ability to send 
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different messages to several recipients using a single key that reduces the load of 
generating the key by the originator and decrypting that key by the TTP. We also 









cing an intermediate node that is responsible to interact with the recipients. 
Protocols are analyzed so that they fulfill the security and non-repudiation requirements 
in efficient manner. We used Petri nets to validate the flow of protocols.  
In the multiple entities non-repudiation protocols the number of recipients may 
vary, so as the number increases there is a chance that the entities are unstable under the
load and system may crash resulting in the productivity loss, user frustration, delays, 
system outage, and data loss/corruption.  
Future works include situations where two or more entities can team-up to caus
problems for other entities. Since the role of TTP is very important, there should be
protocol that involves multiple trusted third parties for economical TTP(s) availabi
Since the protocols are based on the assumption of reliable communication chann
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Glossary A  
BPEL and Web services Terminologies 
Binding: Describes the protocol being used to carry the Web Service communication; 
bindings currently exist for SOAP, HTTP GET, HTTP POST, and MIME.  
BPEL4WS: Business process execution language for web services is a language for the 
formal specification of business processes and business interaction protocols. 
Service Link Type: The service link types of the WSDL document represent the 
interaction between the order service and each of the parties with which it interacts.  
SOAP: Simple Object Access Protocol is a platform-independent protocol that uses 
XML to make remote procedure call over HTTP
SOAP message—an XML message contain all the information necessary to process its 
contents. 
es 
. Each call and response is packaged in a 
Web Services: A web services is a class store on the machine that can be accessed on 
another machine over a network. 
WSDL: Web Services Description language, an XML document that describes how a 
web services behave. A WSDL defines the methods that the web services mak
available and the way in which client can interact with those methods. 
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WS-Security: Web services security language or WS-Security is designed to be used
the basis for the construction of a wide variety of security models including PKI, 
Kerberos, and SSL. Specifically WS-Security provides support for multiple security 
tokens, mu
 as 
ltiple trust domains, multiple signature formats, and multiple encryption 
 The <receive> construct allows the business process to do a blocking wait for 
a matching message to arrive.  
 to a 
 a 
 a request-response operation on the WSDL portType for the process.  
Invoke: The <invoke> construct allows the business process to invoke a one-way or 
request-response operation on a portType offered by a partner. 
Assign: The <assign> construct can be used to update the values of variables with new 
data. An <assign> construct can contain any number of elementary assignments 
 Throw: The <throw> construct generates a fault from inside the business process. 
technologies. 
BPEL Activities:  
The executable actions take place with in BPEL process is called activities. There are 
following BPEL activities [2]. 
Receive:
Reply: The <reply> construct allows the business process to send a message in reply
message that was received through a <receive>. The combination of a <receive> and
<reply> forms
 95
Wait: The <wait> construct allows you to wait for a given time period or until a certain 
time has passed. Exactly one of the expiration criteria must be specified.  
Empty: The <empty> construct allows you to insert a "no-op" instruction into a business 
Sequence: The <sequence> construct allows you to define a collection of activities to be 
Switch: The <switch> construct allows you to select exactly one branch of activity from 
me-out alarm to go off. When one of these triggers occurs, the associated 
activity is performed and the pick completes.  
to specify one or more activities to be 
performed concurrently. Links can be used within concurrent activities to define arbitrary 
control structures.  
Scope: The <scope> construct allows you to define a nested activity with its own 
associated variables, fault handlers, and compensation handler.  
process. 
performed sequentially in lexical order.  
a set of choices.  
While: The <while> construct allows you to indicate that an activity is to be repeated 
until a certain success criteria has been met. 
Pick: The <pick> construct allows you to block and wait for a suitable message to arrive 
or for a ti
Flow: The <flow> construct allows you 
 96
Compensate: The <compensate> construct is used to invoke compensation on an inner 
scope that has already completed normally. This construct can be invoked only from
within a fault handler or another compensation
 
 handler.  
 Non-repudiation ensures that the originator of a message cannot 
the 
Double encrypted Key: A twice-encrypted secret key that is first encrypted with the 
 
Non-repudiation of Receipt (NR ed to protect the originator from the 
recipient falsely denying h
 
 is provided the originator with the evidence 




deny having sent the message or receive of a message cannot deny having received 
message. 
receiver public key and then with the public key of TTP. 
Non-repudiation of origin (NRO): is considered to protect the recipient from the
originator falsely denying having sent the message. 
R): is consider
aving received the message. 
Non-repudiation of Delivery (NRS): is provided the originator with the evidence
that message has been submitted for delivery to the recipient. 
Non-repudiation of Delivery (NRD):
that message has been sent from delivery agent to the recipient. 
Secret Key: symmetric = receiver or transmitter share se





















m(p): it is used to denote distinct color e.g. m(p) = g + r represents place p containing a
token of color g and a token of color r, i.e., CR(m(p)) = {g, r}.
CR(p)MS : Represents the set of multi set or bags over CR(p) e.g. given a set CR(p) = 
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